"AAI said it was feasible" is the most common retort from Parandur's defenders. This section unpacks what AAI actually evaluated, the limits of a pre-feasibility study, and how the Greenfield Airport Policy distributes responsibility.
The DT Next article of July 10, 2026 — widely circulated by Parandur's defenders — argues that because AAI's pre-feasibility study identified Parandur as its preferred site, the government's decision to scrap the project is dishonest. This argument rests on a misunderstanding of both the Greenfield Airport Policy and the distinction between a pre-feasibility scan and detailed project preparation.
Under the Greenfield Airport Policy 2008, the process is:
AAI's role in this process is technical and advisory, not decisive. It evaluates airspace and basic feasibility; it does not make policy decisions about whether a project should proceed. The burden of proof — on land, cost, displacement, and environmental impact — rests entirely with the state government as project proponent.
AAI inspected four sites in February 2022 and submitted its report in March 2022. Its conclusions:
| Site | AAI finding |
|---|---|
| Padalam | Rejected — within IAF restricted flying area |
| Tiruporur | Rejected — adjacent to Tambaram flying area, near Kalpakkam nuclear plant restricted airspace |
| Pannur | Feasible — shortlisted for comparison |
| Parandur | Feasible — preferred after comparative assessment |
AAI preferred Parandur over Pannur for reasons of connectivity, fewer displaced families, fewer man-made obstacles, and contiguous land for expansion. None of these reasons addressed the hydrology or geotechnical suitability of the site — because that was not within the scope of AAI's pre-feasibility mandate.
This is the crucial distinction that the "AAI said it was feasible" argument elides. A pre-feasibility study is a high-level scan conducted over a few weeks. It evaluates airspace and basic operational parameters. It does not:
All of these would be addressed in the detailed project report, Environmental Impact Assessment, and DGCA design approval — stages that the Parandur project had not reached when it was scrapped.
AAI said Parandur was feasible for a runway orientation and basic airspace. It did not say Parandur was suitable for a ₹27,400 crore investment. Those are two very different statements.
In 2023, the Tamil Nadu government passed the Tamil Nadu Land Consolidation (for Special Projects) Act, 2023. This law was designed specifically to allow acquisition of land containing water bodies for "special projects" — a category that included the Parandur airport.
Think about what it means to need a new law to acquire land containing water bodies. The existing land acquisition framework — the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 — has protections against acquiring wetlands and water bodies for precisely the kind of environmental and hydrological risks that Parandur posed. The DMK government chose to legislate around those protections rather than pick a better site.
If Parandur was truly the obvious, technically sound choice that its defenders claim, why was a special law needed to overrule the protections that would normally apply?
A project with nothing to hide does not hide hydrology studies. It does not pass special laws to bypass water body protections. It does not underestimate displacement by a factor of 2.7.